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Abstract 
This paper offers a framework for understanding how different kinds of memory work 
together in interaction with people, photographs and other resources. Drawing on 
evidence from two qualitative studies of photography and memory, as well as literature 
from cognitive psychology, distributed cognition and media studies, I highlight 
complexities that have seldom been taken into account in cognitive psychology research. 
I then develop a “blended memory” framework in which memory and photography can 
be interdependent, blending together as part of a wider activity of distributed 
remembering that is structured by interaction and phenomenology. In contrast to studies 
of cued recall, which commonly feature isolated categories or single instances of recall, 
this framework takes account of people’s histories of photographic practices and beliefs 
to explain the long-term convergence of episodic, semantic and inferential memory. 
Finally, I discuss implications for understanding and designing future memory research. 
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Blended memory: A framework for understanding 
distributed autobiographical remembering with 
photography 
Introduction 
Despite a long tradition of using photographs to support remembering, our psychological 
understanding of this relationship is somewhat superficial. The focus of research has been 
mostly on the effects of using photographs as cues for recall. Examples include Koutstaal 
et al.’s (1998) study showing that reviewing photographs and written descriptions can 
improve older adults’ recall of recent events; Strange et al.’s (2005) study showing that 
doctored photographs can produce false memories; and Loveday and Conway’s (2011) 
study comparing the potential of diary entries and photos taken by a SenseCam (an 
automatic, wearable camera) to aid remembering of previously forgotten experiences. Yet 
engagement with photography extends beyond viewing (looking at photos). It also 
involves capturing (taking photos), organising (sorting into albums, editing, annotating, 
etc.), and sharing (showing, talking about or sending photos to other people). It is 
encouraging, then, that psychologists have recently begun to study capturing practices. 
Henkel (2014) showed that taking photographs can impair subsequent memory for visual 
details of photographed objects and, in a follow-up study, Soares and Storm (2018) 
demonstrated this effect regardless of whether participants expected to have access to the 
photographs in the future.  
 
By examining single practices in isolation, each of the studies cited so far neglected 
potentially important dynamics between practices. Indeed, viewing often happens as part 
of sharing and organising (Van House et al., 2005), while many personal photographs are 
rarely viewed at all, remaining forgotten on cameras or hard drives (Whittaker et al., 
2010). Further, the controlled situations typically used in psychological studies of 
photography do not reflect the diverse contexts and idiosyncratic practices discussed in 
human computer interaction and media studies (e.g. Chalfen, 1984; Keightley and 
Pickering, 2014; Slater, 1995; Van House et al., 2005; Whittaker et al., 2010).  
 
Psychological understandings of memory can be enhanced by interaction with different 
disciplines and research methods. Work in distributed cognition has helped us to 
understand how social and material interactions can constitute intimate elements of 
cognitive processes of remembering (Sutton 2010). Media studies research has shown 
how photographic practices are strongly influenced by technological and cultural context 
(Van House et al., 2005), and that memorial functions of photography overlap with 
communication, creativity and identity construction (Sarvas and Frohlich, 2011). 
Pickering and Keightley (2015) analysed over 100 interviews and several focus groups, 
finding that, through the use of media, their participants’ everyday memory was neither 
entirely individual, nor entirely collective, and was contingent on their material and social 
interactions.  
 
In this paper, I discuss insights from two interview-based studies of photography and 
memory in relation to literature from cognitive psychology, distributed cognition and 
media studies. This is followed by the presentation of a framework of blended memory, 
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in which I argue that everyday autobiographical memory involves a coalescence of 
different kinds of remembering, realised through social and material practices. The 
importance of the phenomenology of individuals engaged in distributed remembering is 
then discussed in relation to the long-term development of photographic practices and 
beliefs about memory. Finally, I propose some implications of this view for considering 
the role of photography in structuring future remembering and for understanding and 
designing memory research. 
Investigating photography practices and memory 
In Study 1, I interviewed six women, aged 30-45, a year-and-a-half after they had 
attended a civil partnership wedding in Scotland. In Study 2, I interviewed 15 University 
staff about photography and remembering across their lifetimes, exploring their changing 
technologies and approaches. In each study, participants selected photographs as stimuli 
for talking about how they had used photography to remember. Interviews for Studies 1 
and 2 and took place in 2012 and 2015, respectively. In this paper, Study 1 participants 
are given initials as pseudonyms (e.g. AE, JI, IO), while Study 2 participants are given 
first names (e.g. Lorraine, Robert, Ingrid). Details of the background, methodology and 
results of these studies are described in depth in Fawns (2017).  
 
Given that memory is reconstructive (Michaelian, 2011a) and prone to various distortions 
and simplifications (Conway, 2005; Kahneman, 2011), it is reasonable to question the 
accuracy of my participants’ accounts, and their understandings of their own 
remembering processes as these relate to photographic practices. However, as Brown and 
Reavey (2015: 137) proposed, remembering is a social process that is not just about 
“producing an account of the past event but also establishing its contemporary 
relevance.” The focus of the present paper is not on accurately characterising actual, past 
photographic practices, but on understanding how engagement with photographs through 
social and material practices contributes to remembering the past. Further, the framework 
of blended memory presented later in the paper is not derived from psychological 
processes as described by participants. Instead, my participants’ accounts served to 
contextualise their practices, indicate their beliefs about memory and technology, and 
provide insights into their understandings of how photography could enhance or impede 
remembering. However, I acknowledge that the ideas presented here will benefit from 
interrogation through other methods. I believe this to be the case with all methods, as 
limitations in each approach can be balanced by the advantages of others. 
 
Inference and the Episodic / Semantic Divide 
 
The distinction between episodic and semantic memory, originally proposed by Tulving 
(1972), has contributed enormously to our psychological understanding of memory 
impairment (Murphy et al., 2008), decision-making (Klein et al., 2002), social 
functioning (Alea and Bluck, 2003; Newman and Lindsay, 2009), and much more. 
Episodic memory is concerned with subjective experience and a sense of “reliving” the 
past, whereas semantic memory pertains to generalised knowledge about the world. 
Information about one’s personal past can be recalled using semantic memory, but this 
contains only the details of what happened, not the subjective, personal connection to 
those details (Conway, 2005; Wheeler et al., 1997). A common method of determining 
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which category an instance of recall belongs to is Tulving's (1985) remember / know 
paradigm, where research participants indicate whether they “remember” (episodic) or 
“know” (semantic) some aspect of the past. The episodic / semantic distinction has been 
explored in depth, across a wide range of situations and through many different methods, 
but often without taking into account the cultures, context and practices that influence 
remembering.1 Consider Jane’s description of using photographs in remembering a life 
event.  
Jane: The photograph becomes the focal point of the memory system that 
everything then extends out from, so, you look at that one particular 
photograph and think, ‘Okay, where was that, when was it, what else 
happened round about?’ and then you just build and build and build and it 
gets wider and wider. 
Despite recent work recognising the integration of episodic and sematic memory (e.g. 
Renoult et al., 2012 on “personal semantics”, and Irish and Piguet, 2013 on the role of 
semantic information in episodic remembering and episodic future thinking), the 
relationship between these categories remains under-theorised. In the example above, 
Jane did not just look at a photograph and episodically or semantically recall parts of an 
experience. She described a “memory system” that combined perception, recall, inference 
and photographic information through a procedural and, potentially, skilled performance. 
As well as facilitating the integration of different elements to construct memory that was 
broader than a single event, inference supported the interpretation of what might have 
happened. In the following example from Study 1, PJ pondered which folk dance was 
represented in a photograph. 
PJ: I think they were maybe doing Strip the Willow, eh — The Dashing 
White Sergeant or something — just looking at the formation of the three 
of them there makes me think of that. 
This example does not fit with Tulving’s (1985) remember / know distinction. PJ did not 
know which dance the people in the photograph were doing, nor did she recall it. Instead, 
she inferred possibilities from the formation of the dancers, coupled with her knowledge 
of the kinds of dances that happened on the night.  
 
Some scholars have explicitly or implicitly suggested that inference does not count as 
remembering. For example, Wells et al. (2014) distinguished inference from “real” 
memory (i.e. recall) in their exploration of early childhood memories. Finding that adults’ 
accounts of their earliest memories were implausibly detailed compared to those of 
children, they suggested that additional detail was added over time, often through 
reference to external sources, such as people or photographs. They proposed that adults 
come to have complex memories of early childhood events through “nonconscious and 
conscious inferences” that function as “contextual scaffolding” for the construction of 
memory (Wells et al., 2014: 1258). Thus, the output of remembering combines inferred 
and “remembered” information in which inferences enable remembrances and vice versa. 
Wells and colleagues’ implied position that inferred details are not “really” remembered 
is problematised by their acknowledgement that all memory contains inferences and that 
all memory is augmented via constructive processes.  
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Similarly, Conway and Loveday (2015) differentiated inferred from remembered details 
and interpreted the pervasive presence of inference to mean that “all memories are to 
some degree false” (p. 580). Yet inference should be seen not simply as a distortive 
influence that produces falseness, but as part of the adaptive, constructive function of 
memory.2 Returning to Wells’ et al. (2014) study, adults augmented or developed 
childhood memories by inferring details that were likely to have been present but that 
could not have been understood by the child at the time of the original experience. It is 
possible, therefore, that inference can enhance, rather than only impair, accuracy 
(Michaelian, 2011a).  
 
In my studies, inference was a critical component of remembering, as participants 
combined what could be seen in photographs with what was known to deduce plausible 
explanations of what was likely to have happened. The process of deduction could be 
immediate, or it could be slow and complex, suggesting parallels with direct and 
generative retrieval, respectively (Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Harris, et al., 
2015). Indeed, inference could be deductive and generative: new information could be 
added during memory “retrieval” (Michaelian, 2011a), such as when my participants in 
Study 1 had learned about previously unseen aspects of the wedding by looking at and 
interpreting other people’s photographs.  
 
In contrast to effortless, direct retrieval, Harris and colleagues (2015: 205) pointed out 
that “in generative retrieval, when encountering a memory cue, one has to bring to mind 
additional, related information and knowledge from one’s life before a specific memory 
is recalled”. However, for my participants, resources were not necessarily brought 
together in the search for “a specific memory”. In Jane’s example, information was 
gathered until she could produce a satisfactory account of the past, whatever that turned 
out to be. She described how the wintry appearance of one photograph, combined with 
Christmas decorations and guests, allowed her to narrow the photographed scene down to 
a particular kind of occasion. 
Jane: I’m looking at these, I can’t quite remember when that was but I’m 
seeing it’s winter, it’s Christmas time, my friends were up visiting.  
From this, she was able to recall further, related information and compare the times at 
which different events happened. 
Jane: What else happened that year, you know, gosh they weren’t married 
at that point, they only just got engaged, their dog was here, [my son] 
liked the dogs but the cats didn’t… 
Jane mixed recalled details, including event-specific and contextual information, with 
predictions about things she would have done. Not all available evidence was contained 
within photographs; it could also be produced through association. 
Jane: And then just thinking about all the other things I would have done 
around that time. I mean, it’s Christmas time so, I’ve gone home for 
Christmas and where did I spend Hogmanay and what other events, cos 
[my son] and I tend to do one thing each year, you know, a kind of 
Christmas event. What was it I did that particular year? 
The photograph was a starting point for associations with winter, Christmas, social events 
and relationships and, gradually, specific details that supported a sense of remembering 
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that extended beyond a particular event. Inference and recall bound together into a larger, 
richer memory, contrasting with models of remembering in which a single act of recall is 
classed as a particular memory type. 
Distributed remembering and photography 
Despite some important moves towards an ecological perspective (e.g. Cohen and 
Conway, 2008; Neisser, 1978), much cognitive psychology literature still lacks a 
thorough appreciation of current and historical, social and material interaction. 
Distributed cognition, drawing from psychology and philosophy, explains how processes 
of thinking can be shared across systems that include people, technologies, media and 
environments (Clark and Chalmers, 1998; Hutchins, 1995; Sutton, 2010). From this 
perspective, cognitive properties of the remembering system are not attributable to 
individual components (Hutchins, 1995). Distributed remembering, then, is not simply 
affected by interaction with external resources, it is constituted by such interaction (e.g. 
Sutton, 2010). 
 
Such views have been criticised as attributing cognitive capacities to inanimate objects 
and as unnecessary for explaining cognition (Adams and Aizawa, 2010), or as overly 
inclusive (Rupert, 2004). Compelling responses to these criticisms have already been 
presented by others (e.g. Clark, 2013; Sutton et al., 2010). Rather than repeat those 
arguments here, I prefer to focus on the methodological value of thinking of remembering 
as distributed (Michaelian and Sutton, 2013): it helps us understand what is important and 
how we might better study it. What counts as cognition is less relevant than what can be 
seen by changing our definition of what counts. 
 
A distributed perspective can help us to understand cueing as more than the coming 
together of present information and stored traces of past experience (Tulving, 1983). For 
my participants, engagement with photographs could bring into awareness the existence 
of past experience or previously known information. It could facilitate mental time travel 
(Michaelian, 2016), where imagery, sensory information, and emotion from the past 
seemed to become present. It could trigger associations between photographs and related 
stories, general concepts, or the “gist” of an event, time period, or relationship (see 
Conway, 2009). Often, photographs were used in deductive, inferential processes to work 
out what must have happened, to confirm details, or to learn things about people or 
events. Each of these processes could facilitate further remembering. Jane’s description, 
above, of the photograph as “the focal point of the memory system” upon which she 
could “build and build and build,” conveys this idea of memory as constructed through a 
progressive layering of interactions. However, it is in the long-term structuring and 
configuring of memory that the distributed nature of remembering becomes clearest. 
 
Structuring memory 
 
By producing potential cues and, in parallel, through the experiences of producing and 
engaging with those cues, photography practices supported a sense of continuity across 
time—from the present “experiencing self” to a future “remembering self”, and from a 
present remembering self, back to a previous experiencing self (Kahneman and Riis, 
2005). Considering these “selves” can illuminate different perspectives from which we 
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prospectively and retrospectively structure remembering. For Kahneman (2011), the 
remembering self selectively generates the story of what happened to the experiencing 
self in the past. However, as Albright (1994) pointed out, the experiencing self also 
provides foundations and constraints for future remembering.  
 
Taking or organising photographs could be seen as attempts to increase the likelihood 
that particular experiences would be remembered, and, thus, photographs were not just 
aids to recall but could help participants to remember to remember. In Study 1, PJ 
conveyed the sense of responsibility of selecting photographs for a wedding album, 
potentially structuring not only her own remembering but that of other people. 
PJ: You do think well, this is going to be important potentially in the 
future and you want to make the right choices. 
Displaying photographs, for example, increased the likelihood that people would see 
them and, therefore, look back at the past. Yet privileging the content of photographs 
within memory might produce a levelling and sharpening effect, as neglected details fade 
into the background while others become emphasised through rehearsal (see Koriat et 
al.’s [2000] description of the Gestalt principles of memory distortion). Thus, alongside 
the possibility that taking photographs impairs memory for what is captured (Henkel, 
2014), looking at photographs might impair memory for what is not captured. To some 
extent, this principle was implicated in purposeful attempts at distributed forgetting, 
where participants disposed of photographs, choose not to take a photograph, or chose 
not to have their photo taken. Of course, an absence of photographs did not make 
memory of the event unavailable or inaccessible (Michaelian, 2011b), but reduced the 
probability of exposure to relevant cues.  
 
It was also not uncommon for participants to use photography to portray a different 
reality through framing, composing, posing, etc. An extreme example was presented by 
Kate in Study 2 (Figure 1 below). 
Figure 1. Photograph of a cat covered in streamers, next to wine glasses 
The image appears to show a cat, sitting on a table, during a celebration. Kate told a very 
different story. 
Kate: It evokes quite a lot of negative memories, which is I think 
interesting because there’s nothing overtly negative about the photo… I 
tried to make it look like we had some sort of a party there… but it was a 
very sad time actually. It was a very lonely time and whatever party is 
perceived there, didn’t actually happen. 
The image had to be reconciled with other remembered information and source 
monitoring processes (Jacoby et al., 1989), and Kate associated this photograph of a 
staged event with her memory of the real experience. It became one of a number of 
photographs that Kate actively avoided looking at. 
 
While in Study 1 there had been very little engagement with wedding photos prior to the 
interviews, in Study 2, years of capturing, sharing and organising practices had 
established rich histories of engagement with selected photographs. This was exemplified 
by Lorraine’s picture of her father and his dog, taken for a newspaper when she was a 
young girl. For years, Lorraine travelled the world, carrying a print of it in her pocket. 
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Later, this fading document was scanned and digitally restored by her brother-in-law and 
became part of a collection displayed in a large digital photo frame on Lorraine’s wall, 
inspiring numerous conversations with visitors. Figure 2 shows the photo displayed via 
the digital frame on Lorraine’s wall, conveying a sense of the changing materiality of the 
image. It would have been impossible to predict this trajectory, in part because some of 
the technology did not exist at the time it was taken. The evolving materiality, social 
interactions and technological possibilities all contributed to a complex and emotion-
laden engagement with the image.  
 
Figure 2. Lorraine’s dad and his dog displayed as a digital photograph in the DigiFrame 
 
Pictures of previous generations could also be viewed in a detached manner, as historical 
rather than personal. For example, Robert's pictures of his grandfather as a young man 
were originally taken as holiday photographs but had become “historical” documents. 
Robert: I only remember him as a very old man, but that’s kind of — what 
do you call it, history, rather than remembrance. 
It may be that, for Robert, “remembrance” required memory of lived experience. Yet 
Nick was able, through an archive constructed by his father, to visualise how his 
ancestors had lived and, thereafter, to remember his impression of their lives. 
Photographs seemed to provide access to a previous context, facilitating the construction 
of memory for events that had not been witnessed first-hand (another concept under-
represented in cognitive psychology3). However, they were also understood in relation to 
the viewer’s current context, and this could be exploited to help participants understand 
themselves and their pasts. A series of photographs helped Nick make sense of his 
daughter's recovery from illness and reflect on what his family had been through. He used 
his photograph collection to think about his family’s progress over time. 
Nick: I see photos as a journey, because life is a journey in general… the 
photos help us take a log of that journey, so we know where we’ve been. 
Thus, beyond supporting recall, participants could use photography as part of an active 
configuration of their understanding of the past. Of course, participants did not always 
intentionally use photography practices to structure memory in the ways described above. 
They could not easily predict where and when they would take photos, often deciding in 
the moment. It was also difficult to predict the future importance of photos or even 
events. Participants had often photographed scenes because, at the time, the experience 
felt important enough to be remembered in the future. Later, they valued these 
experiences differently, presumably because the temporal distance from the original 
experience had changed their perspective (D’Argembeau and Van der Linden, 2004) and 
because the remembering self is necessarily selective (Kahneman and Riis, 2005). On the 
other hand, spontaneous activity could produce unexpectedly valuable photographs. 
Mundane objects prompted reflection on earlier periods, and everyday photographs of 
relatives became emotionally powerful after they had passed away. The unpredictability 
of what makes an effective cue (Van den Hoven, 2014) may have contributed to 
participants generating so many cues. Across both studies, far more photos had been 
taken than could later be appreciated; as IO said, “Who knows what turns out to be the 
photo you look back at and go ‘oh, yeah, that was the key’?” 
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Many participants aspired to be more organised and consistent in their approach to 
photography. They talked of failed intentions and plans that had not been followed, 
mirroring Whittaker et al.’s (2010) participants, whose photograph archives were rarely 
constructed or used as intended. Although there was evidence of effective routines and 
habits (e.g. one participant claimed to always edit his photos as soon as he returned from 
holiday), collections had largely come into being through the accumulation of ad hoc 
photography practices. Taking photographs could simply be a way of engaging with an 
experience (Sarvas and Frohlich, 2011) and not all photographs were taken with the 
intention to create a cue for future remembering, as illustrated by Robert, who valued 
aesthetics over the supporting of memory. 
[Researcher]: Do you have any intention [that they will prompt your 
memory] when you’re taking photographs? 
Robert: No, I don’t, actually, that’s a kind of by-product of what I’m 
doing. Most of my photography is — to try and take some pictures which 
both, in a sense, record it, but also are aesthetically-pleasing and attractive. 
While the content of participants’ photograph collections was not arbitrary, nor was it the 
product of a coherent remembering strategy. The reasons for taking photographs were 
multiple and overlapping: memorial, communicative and creative pictures could be taken 
in competing pursuits of “truth”, aesthetic value and personal meaning. In any case, 
photograph collections did not need to be organised or coherent to effectively support 
remembering. In fact, archives that were somewhat chaotic could encourage the 
excitement of serendipitous rediscovery.  
 
Phenomenology and belief in distributed remembering 
 
While distributed cognition has informed recent developments in our understanding of 
contextualised, socially- and materially-supported remembering (e.g. Clowes, 2013; 
Dahlbäck et al., 2013; Sutton et al., 2010), it has tended to focus on the components, 
functions and outputs of distributed systems, and our understanding of what it is like to 
remember in distributed ways, through everyday practices, remains limited. This is not to 
imply that phenomenology is distributed, but that it is critical to distributed remembering. 
The phenomenology of individuals engaging in distributed remembering motivates future 
practices. It also underpins nuanced source and reality monitoring (Johnson and Raye, 
1981) and the intuitive understanding of whether photos represent our own past or that of 
others. For my participants, inference involved a sense of probability, rather than 
certainty, about what had happened. Associations reconciled event-specific details with 
personally-meaningful and, often, emotive ideas. Many narratives featured expressions of 
emotional and sensory memory consonant with the notion of “mental time travel” 
(Michaelian 2016; Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007).  
 
Beliefs about photography, memory and experience also contributed to how attention was 
paid to events. Some participants claimed that taking photographs interrupted experience, 
while others positioned photography as a legitimate part of experience. Lorraine, for 
example, claimed that a camera “gets in the way of experiencing stuff,” whereas Robert 
saw taking photos as part of acting and seeing.  
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Robert: Often the experience and the photograph kind of merge, it’s not as 
if they are distinct things. The fact that I take a photograph, actually it’s 
part of the experience.  
Ingrid believed that the expense and limited capacity of analogue film made her more 
careful about what she photographed, and that this increased the value not only of the 
resulting photographs but also of the practices. Effortful photography was, according to 
Ingrid, more conducive to remembering because it required greater attention to both the 
scene and the experience of taking the photograph. 
[Researcher]: So how does taking a photo help you remember a moment?   
Ingrid: That is a lot easier with the analogue camera for me, I think, 
because you actually have to work for the picture, because you have to 
wind the film and then, you know, kind of — you have to focus and 
then… wind the film again… I like it. It takes time so you have to take the 
time, if that makes any sense. It’s very, very hard to take a picture just 
walking by something.   
We cannot know whether analogue photography actually was more beneficial to 
remembering for Ingrid than digital, or under what circumstances. For her, it seemed to 
produce a different way of paying attention to a scene, and a different valuing of 
photographs. Nonetheless, we should be wary of general claims about the superiority for 
remembering of analogue photography (e.g. because it leads to more focused attention or 
a greater valuing of images) or of digital photography (e.g. because it opens up powerful 
opportunities for individual and shared engagement with images). While different 
functions and limitations of technology were important, they were not inherently positive 
or negative. Beliefs, emotions, personal associations and circumstances shaped 
interactions, produced different experiences, and motivated future practices. 
A framework of Blended Memory 
In this section, I develop a framework of blended memory that draws primarily on 
Sutton’s (2010) complementarity view of distributed cognition, in which photography 
does not stand in for biological processes but is recruited in ways that complement what 
is already present within the distributed remembering system. However, blended memory 
differs from most conceptions of distributed cognition (including Sutton’s) by focusing 
on everyday practices – both social and material – and how these are experienced, how 
they are located within long-term trajectories of activity, and how distributed processes 
are reconciled with established categories of memory from cognitive psychology. The 
kinds of memory represented by these categories are, in turn, treated as useful abstract 
concepts that operate interdependently in everyday remembering, connected together 
through material and social interactions. The application of this framework to a detailed 
consideration of everyday photography practices represents an attempt to move beyond 
the relatively simplistic examples of social and material interaction that are common in 
distributed cognition research (Loader, 2013). 
 
Key claims: 
• Memory manifests as distributed remembering activity.  
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• Remembering activity involves the integration of different kinds of memory in 
combination with media practices. 
• Remembering activity is both spatially and temporally distributed. 
• Remembering can be partially structured through media practices. 
Key implications: 
• Past remembering activity and media practices have significant implications for 
current and future activity. 
• Results of memory experiments are situated in historical, cultural and 
environmental contexts.  
• Controlled experiments should be complemented by ecologically-valid studies, 
observation of actual practices, and other methods. 
 
 
Memory as distributed remembering activity 
 
Despite a large body of research, there remains debate about whether the episodic and 
semantic systems should be considered physically distinct entities or theoretical systems 
that explain qualitative differences in the experience of remembering (Glenberg, 1997; 
Szpunar et al., 2014; Tulving, 1985). As Tulving (2002: 323) put it, “yes, we can talk 
about memory systems and memory processes … but we have little idea how ‘real’ these 
systems and processes are”. In other words, perhaps “memory” is just a convenient label 
for activity that emerges as a coincidence of cognitive processes at the point of 
remembering.  
 
Conceptions of memory systems as biological have not adequately captured interactions 
with technology and media because remembering is assumed to be internal (i.e. to happen 
entirely within the head). It is possible to think of remembering, not as occurring within 
biological or external elements (Michaelian, 2012; Sutton, 2010), but as constituted by 
interactions between them. Sutton (2006), for example, argued that the distribution of 
episodic recall can be seen in Tulving’s (1983) influential notion of synergistic ecphory, 
in which cued recall is contingent on the interaction between encoded information 
(memory traces) and retrieval information (cues). Thinking of remembering as distributed 
activity, in which different cognitive processes are recruited according to the situation 
(Sutton, 2010), helps to avoid the temptations and challenges of conceiving of memory as 
a reified “thing” that we carry around inside our heads with static characteristics and 
continuity of form.  
 
Memory systems are also commonly represented as independent, as if memory is 
episodic or semantic or procedural or prospective (e.g. Tulving and Schacter, 1992). 
Whether or not they can operate independently, the claim here is that, in the main, 
remembering with photography facilitates the interoperation of multiple kinds of 
memory. It will not be surprising, even to those who study elements of memory in 
isolation, that a combination of different kinds of remembering is required for many 
situations (Michaelian, 2012). However, I argue that different aspects of memory do 
more than collaborate: they support and sustain each other to produce a larger 
coalescence of remembering that is experienced holistically. An important claim of the 
blended memory framework is that the interplay between kinds of memory can be, to 
some extent at least, realised via spatially and temporally distributed media practices. For 
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my participants, authentic remembering was perceived not just according to conventional 
parameters such as subjective re-experience or fluency (Jacoby et al., 1989), but also in 
relation to associations with other events and ideas that located remembrances in a wider 
context. A fuller memory was a more authentic one, even where inference or generative 
content was evident in its construction, or where photography was seen as essential to the 
success of remembering. Indeed, interactions with photography were, themselves, 
experiences (including experiences of remembering) that could be remembered.  
 
Blended memory explicitly considers remembering beyond discrete moments, as 
distributed over long periods of time with the history of material and social interactions 
contributing to how remembering is done in the present. Just as photography involves 
capturing, viewing organising and sharing, memory involves prospectively and 
retrospectively selecting, structuring and constructing resources (such as photos and 
albums), and practising ways of engaging with them. Within this, phenomenology of 
remembering and historical engagement with photography are both likely to shape future 
remembering, not only in motivating the development of photographic practices, but also 
by shaping processes of remembering (Loader, 2013).  
 
Methodological implications 
 
While classifications such as episodic and semantic memory have been crucial to the 
abstraction and generalisation of memory processes (Tulving, 1972), considering the 
integration of different kinds of memory allows for more diverse, realistic, complex and 
long-term conceptions of how memory works in everyday settings. Yet, blended memory 
need not disrupt established psychological categories, since the focus is not directly on 
memory but on remembering. Thinking of remembering as distributed activity can 
enhance our understanding of important psychological theories. For example, it allows us 
to see that positioning particular categories as discrete and as more or less legitimate 
forms of memory can obscure the ways in which they structure and support each other. 
Indeed, it would be interesting to consider how categories of autobiographical memory 
discussed here (episodic, semantic, inferential) might interact with other kinds of 
memory. Two possibilities include exploring how configuring future remembering relates 
to prospective memory, and how practising ways of distributed remembering relates to 
procedural memory. Blended memory values the phenomenological qualities of memory 
established through psychological research, but also frames them in relation to the 
motivation of future practices. This framing might challenge scholars of distributed 
cognition to take a long-term view of the roles of beliefs and motivations: in looking 
beyond the immediate output of distributed systems, the experience of remembering 
becomes important to learning distributed practices, and to choosing which people, 
materials and practices to engage with in future remembering.  
 
The framework also provides a critical lens through which to consider the parameters and 
implications of memory research. For example, Henkel’s (2014) findings that taking 
photographs of objects in a museum impaired recall for visual details of those objects 
should be treated cautiously, since social and material environments, idiosyncratic and 
historical practices, customisations of technology, beliefs, and ways of making 
retrospective sense of available cues, are all important elements of remembering. 
Controlling participants’ engagement with photography allows researchers to generalise 
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about effects, but these effects may be particular to the isolated, short-term and controlled 
situations in which they are observed. For example, by determining the cameras used, 
what could be photographed, and the timing of remembering; and by preventing 
participants from looking at or talking about their images, Henkel placed significant 
limitations on their possibilities for engaging with technology, other people and, 
ultimately, their photographs. Indeed, Henkel acknowledged that different effects might 
be produced by allowing participants to look at their photos.  
 
The study of capturing, organising, sharing and viewing practices will be necessary to 
build a more complex understanding of engagement with photography. As such, Henkel’s 
(2014) study of the effects of taking photos is a productive step forward. However, like 
studies of cued recall, Henkel’s study focused on a single practice in isolation. 
Interpreting such results is challenging, since each practice is located within a historical 
trajectory of related practices (e.g. we often look at photos that we have taken, organised 
and shared in particular ways, and those prior practices influence how we interpret the 
image). In blended memory, remembering is not so much changed by particular 
conditions but produced in relation to them. The involvement of interweaving practices 
means that even as one aspect of remembering is reduced, others may come in to 
compensate. Henkel’s effects, for example, might be compensated for by organising, 
sharing or viewing photographs, or talking with people. Studying the relationship 
between practices over time, in ecologically-valid situations, is necessary to take into 
account how people negotiate remembering “in the wild” (Michaelian, 2012: 1163).  
 
Sutton (2010) argued that crossing methods and traditions can open up new avenues of 
thought, and results from one method can be used to inform studies that use another. 
Henkel’s results, for example, raise interesting questions that can inform explorations of 
how capturing practices play out in everyday settings, and what the real world 
implications are for remembering. Conversely, the work of Wang (2013), Pickering and 
Keightley (2015), Van House et al. (2005) and others has demonstrated the potential of 
ethnography and interviews to contribute to psychological understandings of memory by 
capturing everyday practices over long periods of time, and investigating how they 
might reframe, reinforce, mitigate or contrast with the sorts of phenomena picked up in 
experimental studies. Understanding blended memory will require the investigation of a 
large range of scenarios and practices in ecologically-valid settings, over longer 
timeframes, meaning that experiments will need to be augmented by naturalistic 
observation, interviews, and other methods.  
 
The blended memory framework also highlights opportunities for future work. If the 
distributed activity of remembering can be structured and practised, this opens up many 
avenues for memory research. For example, Harris et al. (2014) proposed that some 
aspects of neural decline in dementia might be masked by distributed processes of 
remembering. This indicates both that cognitive capacity—even in cases of impairment—
might be enhanced through distributed activity, and, at the same time, that identifying the 
need for medical or psychological intervention could be delayed without measures that 
take external memory support into account. Meanwhile, the importance of the 
phenomenology of remembering means we should be cautious in how we configure 
memory through distributed practices. In any case, the extent to which people can control 
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how they remember is questionable, given the complexity of the factors that influence 
situated activity. All of these issues reflect productive avenues for memory studies. 
Conclusion: blending systems and resources in remembering 
Psychological studies of cued recall have neglected important aspects of the relationship 
between photography and memory. Photography not only influences what is recalled 
when looking at pictures but is part of both remembered experiences and of experiences 
of remembering. Memory weaves its way through photographic acts of capturing, 
organising, viewing and sharing, and engaging in these practices contributes to how 
people distribute their remembering over time. Therefore, factors that affect experience 
(e.g. beliefs about memory or technology) may be as important as contextual factors that 
more directly affect behaviour (e.g. technology, culture or environment).  
 
Composing and taking photographs, alongside organising and sharing, are part of 
prospective configurations of what one remembers and how one will be remembered. 
This is combined with retrospective practices that make use of cues that have previously 
been put in place. However, these prospective and retrospective practices are not always 
intentional, systematic or clearly aligned. My participants found it difficult to engage in 
consistent patterns of activity due to spontaneous, unplanned actions; incompatible or 
unclear goals and motivations; beliefs about technology; or the influence of contextual 
factors. Nonetheless, such inconsistency could lead to highly rewarding, unexpected 
engagement with photographs.  
 
I have argued that different kinds of remembering, such as those reflected in established 
categories of episodic, semantic or inferential memory, are interdependent, blending 
together through interaction with material and social resources. I have also argued that 
understanding distributed remembering involves more than simply understanding how 
components of a distributed system work together. While cognitive psychology has often 
understated the relationship between material and social resources and remembering, 
distributed cognition has often neglected the importance of phenomenological aspects of 
memory in relation to everyday practices. Feelings, emotions and beliefs are important, 
not only for what practices do or do not take place, but what kinds of connections are 
made with the past. The framework of blended memory, introduced here, aims to 
highlight the fundamental roles played by both distributed activity and the experience of 
that activity, not as separate elements but as interdependent, intertwining, constituent 
parts of a wider remembering system. Some important methodological implications of 
this view have been discussed, including a need to consider the ways in which different 
kinds of remembering work together, the value of taking a long-term perspective of 
remembering activity, and possibilities for exploring people’s capacity to structure and 
practise autobiographical remembering in everyday settings. 
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Notes 
1 There are notable exceptions to these criticisms, particularly within developmental 
psychology. See, for example, Fivush and Haden (2003) or Wang (2013). 
2 Bernecker (2010) gave us an exception to this trend of de-legitimising inference as a 
form of remembering by highlighting the prominence of “inferential memory” or 
“memory based on inferential reasoning” (p. 25). Yet despite claiming that most 
memories are inferential, he ruled this kind of memory out of consideration for the 
majority of his book, and thus continued the pattern of neglecting the close empirical 
study of inference as a legitimate aspect of autobiographical remembering. 
3 Though see Pillemer et al. (2015) for a definition of “vicarious memory”; Barnier and 
Sutton (2008: 179) on the incorporation into memory of information “not originally 
encoded”; and Brookfield et al. (2008) on vicarious memory in adoptive families. 
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